The signi cant decline in union membership over the 1990s, and in union density (membership as a proportion of all employees) since the late 1970s, is thought by many commentators to re ect or proxy a broader weakening of sympathy towards unionism in general (eg Rawson 1983) . This article examines trends in union sympathy in Australia and how recent patterns in Australia compare with those in other countries. In this paper, the term 'union sympathy' is used to describe the general views about unions held by people (as opposed to their direct personal experiences of the gains or losses from union membership).
This paper presents data that extend the analysis in Peetz (1998) . The existing literature, summarised there, indicates that union sympathy does affect union membership, but that it is not commonly the sole or even most important determinant. That study also distinguishe d between the reasons people have for joining and for leaving unions, and showed that union sympathy is an in uential factor helping determine whether people join unions, but has only a limited effect on whether people leave unions once they are members (Peetz 1998) . In relation to joining, it showed that antipathy towards unions could be a strong in uence preventing people joining unions. Given that union sympathy in uences union David Peetz is an Associate Professor in the School of Industrial Relations at Grif th University. He is the author of Unions in a Contrary World: The Future of the Australian Trade Union Movement (1998). membership, this article considers two major issues: how has union sympathy changed over time; and what can we learn from examining Australian union sympathy in an international context? Our interest here is in understandin g union sympathy, not union density, though we will also touch on the implications of trends in union sympathy for understandin g changes in union density.
Our method for investigatin g the rst question is to analyse data from published opinion polls, undertaken by commercial organisation s (Morgan Gallup Poll, Australian Public Opinion Polls, Age Poll, Newspoll) or academic institution s (the National Social Science Surveys, Internationa l Social Science Surveys, Australian Election Surveys, and Australian Political Attitude Surveys, conducted mainly through the Australian National and Macquarie Universities ) over the period from the 1940s to the 1990s, with most of the emphasis on the last two decades. To investigate the second question, we use opinion poll data from Australia and other countries where comparisons are possible .
There is, unfortunately, no single time-series source for public opinion on unions, so we are forced to rely on data concerning several aspects of union sympathy from these several sources. The above surveys generally use 'all Australian adults' as the population from which samples are drawn, and so enable comparisons over time to take place. Different surveys also tend to use differently worded questions. We have therefore relied on polls where the questions are phrased suf ciently closely as make the effect of differences in wording minimal. Often exactly the same question is repeated on occasions many years apart. The combined impact of sampling error and minor differences in question wording is to introduce 'white noise' into the data but, as will be seen, the trends that are observed over time are suf ciently large as to be unattributabl e to these disturbances in the data. We present the data in the form of bar charts; the numbers underpinnin g the bar charts, and the sources, question wordings and sample sizes, are shown in the Appendix.
Before discussing these analyses, however, we paint a brief historical picture of the industrial and political context in which changes in public opinion should be observed. This is not a history of post-war politics and industrial relations, but rather an overview of some of those trends which may be relevant to the development of public opinion. We focus on: the rise and fall of anti-communism; the norms of arbitration; and the level of industrial disputation.
Historical Context
'Public opinion', as measured by surveys or polls, re ects a variety of forces: socialisatio n through family, religion, class, peers, education and the community; the direct experiences of individuals ; the interpretation of events as portrayed in the media; and public debate, information and propaganda conducted by or disseminated through opinion leaders such as politicians, commentators and the media; and the immediate context in which questions are asked (Albig 1956; Childs 1964; Schwartz 1966; Bogart 1977; Oskamp 1977; Hunt 1978; Weimann 1991; Jordan 1993; Mutz 1997 ). We do not attempt here to deal with the impact of changes in each of these areas. For example, changes in socialisation through education are beyond the scope of this paper (though also likely to be of minor importance, as the education syllabus has rarely given priority to union or industria l relations issues). Rather, in looking to understand changes in sympathy towards unions, we focus on particular events that may have directly affected people or have been interpreted for them through the media, and touch on the role of propaganda and public debate.
We are not attempting to argue here that public opinion is 'objectively' measured by polls: as exempli ed later, the responses people give to polls re ect in part the way the questions are worded. Our intent here is not so much to assert in an absolute sense how public opinion regarding trade unions can be characterised, but to see how it has changed over time and how any changes relate to other developments. For example, on union power, we do not try to conclude that Australians would be happier if unions had less power, merely on the strength of a nding that the majority of Australians agree with a statement that Australian unions have too much power. Approaching the question a different way-asking people if they would prefer that unions in their workplace had more in uencewould yield quite different results (Peetz 1996) , and indeed could suggest that Australians would be less happy if unions were weaker. Instead, our interest is in making comparisons over time between several polls with broadly similar wording on, for example, whether unions have too much power-to determine whether this aspect of overall sympathy towards unions has improved or deteriorated over time-and where possible on making comparisons between Australia and overseas-to determine if sympathy towards unions is lower or higher in Australia than counterpart countries.
A feature that has set Australian industrial relations apart from those in most other industrialise d nations has been the arbitration system. The origins of arbitration in Australia date to the industrial defeats of the 1890s as unions battled employers facing substantial pressure to reduce costs in the context of economic depression. Unemployed workers took the jobs of striking unionists and membership of unions had, after two decades of substantial expansion, declined dramatically. Unions sought legislative refuge from further employer onslaughts . In the 1890s and 1900s, tribunal-based arbitral systems or wages boards were introduced in the Australian colonies-cum-State s and, in 1904, in the Australian federal system (Macintyre 1983) . Arbitration was founded on the utopian hope that it would bring an end to industrial con ict. Industrial action was illegal through most of the twentieth century, though for a considerable time until the mid-1980s the limitation on strikes had little practical effect on industria l behaviour. Only with the passage of the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 did strikes in support of a proposed agreement become legal in the federal jurisdiction . The federal tribunal was precluded from settling such disputes by arbitration. Broadly similar developments occurred across most State jurisdiction s in the 1990s.
Strikes, then, ran against the ideals of the arbitration system and, we might expect, against the norms of voters. We might also expect that consumers become annoyed with (and less sympathetic to) unions when their purchasing or transport plans are disrupted by industrial action. Indeed, there is survey evidence that employees whose work is disrupted by industrial action also become annoyed with and less sympathetic to unions. In the 1990-91 Survey of Employees in Metropolitan Sydney Establishments (SEMSE; see Peetz 1998) , union sympathy amongst the 942 employees surveyed was lower in workplaces which, according to data from the 1990 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS; see Callus et al 1991) , had experienced disruption in production as a result of industria l action elsewhere. Interestingly , this relationship was only evident in workplaces which, themselves, had not experienced strike action in the previous year. Amongst workplaces which had not experienced a strike over the year preceding AWIRS, but which had experienced disruption due to industrial action elsewhere, 43% of respondents in the employee survey were recorded as having anti-union sympathy; where there had been no disruption due to action elsewhere, anti-union sympathy was only 28%. In workplaces which had themselves experienced strike action, disruption through industrial action elsewhere had no effect on union sympathy. In other words. industria l action appears to have a negative impact on union sympathy only amongst people who cannot empathise, through their own experience, with the situation facing strikers.
In sum, in light of the norms of arbitration, Australian unions could have dif culty in obtaining the sympathy of the general public if their behaviour is at odds with the norms of the legal system in place-that is, if unions engage in high levels of industria l disputatio n at times when it is expected that they should accept the decision of the independent arbitrator. People's direct experiences of the impact of industrial disputes (shortages of goods or transport) may make them feel more negative towards unions. This may be all the more so when they feel union behaviour goes against the norms of the industrial relations system. Any antagonism may be heightened by the role of the mass media, which have generally been considered to be antagonisti c towards unions, particularly during industria l disputes (Windschuttle 1981) . There is also evidence from Britain of an inverse relationship between changes in union sympathy and industrial con ict Bain 1988, 1990) . Consequently , disapproval of unions might be highest when industrial con ict is at its highest.
What, then, were the trends in industrial disputatio n in the post-war era? For the rst ve years, disputatio n was at high levels-averaging 1.7 million working days lost (WDL) per annum. This fell to a fairly consistent average of 1.0 million WDL during the 1950-56 period, and then an average of only 0.6 million over the 1957-67 period (Deery and Plowman 1991, 66) . However, the wage determination system underwent a period of gradual decentralisatio n from 1967 to 1974, in no small part because the authority of the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission with the union movement was eroded as a result of the Commission's decision in the Metal Trades Work Value case to increase award rates of pay but to stipulate that these increases be absorbed into over-awards. Unions successfully resisted absorption and moved away from national wage determination to industrylevel negotiations . During the period from 1961 to 1967, some 85% of the overall increase in award rates of pay was accounted for by national wage increases in basic wage, margins and total wage cases. This fell to 53% in 1969-70, and by 1974-75 only 21% of the increase in award wages was attributable to national wage cases (Hancock Committee 1985, 44) . Recorded industrial con ict rose, with 2.0 million WDL in 1969, 3.1 million in 1971 and 6.2 million in 1974. Disputation eased in 1975 but still averaged 3.2 million WDL per annum over the 1975-81 period. Only with the introductio n of the prices and incomes Accord from 1983 could a sustained reduction in industrial con ict be observed, with disputatio n averaging 1.2 million working days lost annually over the 1983-96 period (ABS 2001b) . Multivariate studies have shown that the Accord was associated with a reduction in disputatio n well below that which would be predicted on the basis of trends in macroeconomic variables including unemployment (Beggs and Chapman 1987a, b; Chapman and Gruen 1990; Wilson 1994, 1995) . Initially, the decline in industrial disputatio n associated with the Accord in its centralised period was almost entirely a result of an 80% decline in the number of working days lost due to disputes over wages. With the introductio n of enterprise bargaining under the Accord, there was a further drop in all types of industrial dispute apart from 'other disputes' (this last result simply re ecting the protests against the Victorian government's industrial relations legislation in 1992). This suggests that there was a change in 'strike psychology ' associated with the introductio n of enterprise bargaining and of the right to strike, which clari ed the role of industrial disputatio n in contrast with the ever ambiguous position under awards and arbitration. Notwithstandin g the waterfront dispute (which did not appear in of cial statistics), disputatio n was lower still in the post-Accord period of the Howard government.
Overall, then, in the Australian context of a con ict between the taking of strike action and the norms of the arbitration system, we would expect that sympathy towards unions would be lower during and after the rise in disputatio n levels evident in the 1970s, and would improve during and perhaps after the Accord, but we could not prima facie predict the speed and durability with which public opinion changes in response to changes in disputation levels. In addition, the extent of these changes could depend on the type of measure being used. For example, during the Accord unions may have been seen as being more powerful (due to the close relationship with the Labor government) but also more responsible. Measures of union sympathy that test the degree to which unions are seen as acting responsibly may therefore show a stronger improvement than those which test the degree to which they are seen as being too powerful.
A factor that may have had an important in uence on attitudes to unions in the 1950s and 1960s was the communist/anti-communist ghting within the union movement, culminating in the split in the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the formation of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) in the mid-1950s (Rawson 1978, 101-23) . The effect of this split was to cripple the ALP politically , largely preventing it from regaining of ce until 1972 nationally, and until later in several States. Left-and Right-wing unions battled for coverage of already unionised employees. As Rawson (1978, 107) pointed out, in no other Western country except Italy and France did communists become so prominent in trade unions and in Australia, unlike those countries, unionism was the only sphere in which communists attained prominence. Consequently , anti-communism was intimately associated with anti-unionism in Australia in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly when anti-communist ideology was being propagated by conservative political parties and media. Only with the re-election of the Whitlam ALP government in 1974, which also saw the demise of the DLP from the Senate, could anti-communism be said to have lost salience as a major feature of Australian polity. Even then, its effects on the union movement lingered for two more decades, with several unions associated with the DLP not reaf liating with the ALP for some years. We might expect that the rhetoric and propaganda of anti-communism would damage sympathy towards unions and this would be most apparent in the 1950s and 1960s. On the other hand, the decline in industrial disputatio n between the early 1950s and the early 1960s might lead to an improvement in union sympathy during this period. The net impact of these two forces is not easy, prima facie, to predict.
One other issue that may need to be taken into account is the degree to which broader changes in society have made collectivist orientations more dif cult.
D. PEETZ
Assertions are commonly made (eg BCA 1989) that Australia is becoming a much more individualisti c society and that, because of this, unionism is no longer relevant. Although these claims are often exaggerated (Frenkel and Peetz 1990) , there are some aspects of social change that may undermine union sympathy over the very long term. Changes in transportation , urbanisation and technology make it less essential that people working together live near each other and so reduce the impetus for developing a sense of common community purpose at work. The growth of individualisti c leisure pursuits such as television and computer games may have an effect. Business groups themselves seek more aggressively to promote individualis m as an ideal ahead of collectivism (eg BCA 1989), because of a growth of anti-union ideology amongst employers and changes in the economic environment in which large rms operate and which make rms more resistant to unions (Coghill 1987) . And the decline in union density itself may reduce union sympathy: there is a well-researched link between parental union membership and sympathy towards unionism (Van de Vall 1970; Gallie 1989; Hartley 1992) and so, over the long term, declining density amongst parents will of itself change the way in which socialisatio n occurs and lead to declining sympathy amongst a new cohort of voters.
Indeed, in relation to the question of how union sympathy has changed over time, we are also interested in what this implies about the reasons behind the decline in union density. Consequently , it is worth brie y describing trends in union density over the post-war period. By the end of the Second World War, union density in Australia, bolstered by the arbitration system, stood at 54%. It dipped slightly to 51% immediately after the war, then resumed an upward path that had been under way since late in the Great Depression, peaking at 63% in 1953 at the height of the Korean War boom. Thereafter union density declined gradually, to trough at 49% in 1969 and 1970. It rose to 56% by 1975 and remained within one or two percentage points of that, on the union census data, for several years. Since the mid-1980s, however, it has fallen substantially , and by 1999 little more than one in four employees belonged to a union in their main job. Some have claimed that increased disillusionmen t of union members with their unions has been re ected in further declines in union membership (Moore 1989; Rawson 1983) . If this is so, there should be a substantial decline recorded in union sympathy during the 1980s and 1990s.
Changing Union Sympathy
The major dif culty in investigating changes in union sympathy lies in the absence of a consistent series of data on union sympathy. However, there are a few questions which have been asked often enough in opinion polls to enable some trends to be examined. We consider data on seven issues, covering various periods since the 1940s.
The rst of these issues concerns whether unions have been a good thing or not for the country. Results can be seen in Figure 1 . These questions have been asked principally in opinion polls at various times over the past four decades. Despite some variation in wording, it seems that union sympathy as measured by these questions was substantiall y stable (though with some slight decline) between 1951 and 1966, but there was a more substantial shift against unions some time between 1966 and 1974. After then there appears to have been some oscillation of responses SYMPATHY FOR THE DEVIL? 63 Table A1 in the Appendix.
to this question. By the end of the 1980s, responses to the question were only slightly worse for unions than they had been in 1974, but much worse than they had been in 1952. With the relatively small number of observations in 1992, the movement from 1990 to 1992 was not statistically signi cant. Not shown in the chart are several Newspoll surveys undertaken from 1996 and commissioned by the Labour Council of NSW, which sought people's attitudes on the converse proposition-whether Australia would be better off without unions. The proportion agreeing fell from 23% in 1996 to 14% in 2001 (Peetz 1998; Workers Online 2001) , indicating an improvement in union sympathy. It is not clear, then, whether there was much movement during the Accord period on this indicator of union sympathy, which embodies views about unions' historical role. Responses to our second question, which have a more contemporary orientation, suggest that union sympathy may have increased during the Accord period (1983-96). On various occasions from 1984 to 1995, the Australian Election Survey and National Social Science Survey asked respondents how good a job the trade unions were doing for the country. The proportion of respondents saying unions were doing a 'fairly good', 'very good' or 'excellent' job rose gradually from around 35% to 50% between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s (see Figure  2) . or 'excellent'. For precise question and sources see Table A2 in the Appendix.
fear of being forced to join a communist-led union may have been salient) and most polls taken from the 1960s onwards show a high level of oppositio n to compulsory unionism. There is little information on which to identif y trends in the Accord period (see Figure 3) . One general comment worth making, however, is that the high level of opposition recorded to compulsory unionism partly re ects the wording of the questions. For example, a 1959 poll showed a clear majority (63% to 29%) opposed to compulsory unionism -but it also showed a majority (54% to 32%) supporting the idea that 'if jobs become scarce … members of trade unions should … have rst preference for jobs, over non-unionists '. Discrepancies of similar magnitude were found in other surveys around that time (APOP 1956 (APOP , 1958b (APOP , 1959 .
2 This is not, of course, to suggest that such a notion would still command majority support in current times.
A much larger number of observations (though over a shorter time) are available on our fourth set of questions, concerning whether unions have too much power. The data are presented in Figure 4 .
As can be seen, there are several different ways in which the question has been asked. The most problematic distinctio n is between those questions which ask speci cally about union power, and those which provide respondents with a list of several groups, and ask them to identif y those groups which have too much (and Table A3 in the Appendix.
not enough) power. The latter approach appears to produce lower and possibly more erratic numbers than the former approach (the same thing happens when you ask people what they think about the power of 'big business'), and the following interpretation takes this into account. The data indicate a major increase between 1967 and 1976 in the proportion of people who considered that unions had too much power. Although some of this may have occurred in the 1967-71 period, it seems that the greatest change took place between 1971 and 1974. This pattern is consistent with the data on whether unions are a good thing, shown in Figure 1 . This deterioration in public support for unions coincided with a marked escalation of industrial disputatio n to a post-war peak in 1974.
Through the latter part of the 1970s, attitudes towards union power remained fairly stable at this new, higher level of antagonism. But in 1979 there appeared to be another rise in the extent of the belief that unions had too much power. This was probably associated with an increase in public perceptions of industrial disputation. 3 Soutar, Savery and Dufty (1985) found a similar pattern of deteriorating attitudes to unions in 1979 in their own survey of Perth residents and attributed it to an increase in industrial con ict (see also NSSS 1989). After a short fall, the proportion of Australians thinking unions had too much power remained at nearly 80% until the Accord came into place. Table A4 in the Appendix.
A negative relationship between union sympathy and industrial con ict would suggest that the reduction in industrial con ict associated with the Accord should have been accompanied by an improvement in pro-union sympathy. Initially, however, this did not occur: the belief that unions had too much power remained at its new high level of nearly 80% until well into the Accord period. The Accord was widely and correctly seen by commentators as representing an increase in union power at the peak level (Carney 1988) , and presumably this perception was partly shared by the wider public. If union power is seen to be increasing, then the number of people who say that unions have too much power would also increase. 4 After three or four years of the Accord, the belief that unions had too much power started to decline. It is unclear whether this just re ected public acceptance that industria l disputatio n had undergone a more permanent, downward shift, or also re ected a perception of declining union power. But by the mid-1990s the state of union sympathy on this measure was better than it had been since the early 1970s. In 1994 and 1995, the proportion of people claiming that unions had too much power fell below 60%. It rose slightly in the 1996 election period, during which the Secretary of the ACTU made comments implying industrial turmoil under a future Coalition government. Not shown in this chart are subsequent declines in the proportions of adults who both 'clearly agree' that unions have too much power and 'clearly disagree' that strong unions are essential to protect Australians' wages, in an annual survey by Quantum, from 36% in 1997 to 33% in 1999 33% in and 28% in 2001 33% in (AustraliaSCAN 2001 . 5 However, the decline in Figure 5 . 'Generally against strikers.' Percentage saying 'generally against', 'usually against' or 'almost always against'. For precise questions and sources see Table A5 in the Appendix.
anti-union sentiment on this index was not matched by an equal improvement in pro-union sentiment.
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The overall pattern on union power was consistent with the pattern shown regarding some other aspects of union sympathy in Figure 1 , where we saw that the belief that unions were a good thing was almost as prevalent in 1990 as it had been in 1974, and in Figure 2 , which showed an improvement in public attitudes on what sort of job unions were doing for the country during the Accord period. However, by reference to union power, union sympathy was still not as positive in the late 1990s as it had been in the mid-1960s.
Our fth set of questions concern people's reported general sympathies for or against strikers. Antagonism towards strikers rose appreciably between 1969 and 1979, consistent with the pattern in the 'too much power' series (see Figure 5) . By the mid-1980s, however, sympathy towards strikers was at, or better than, the levels of the later 1960s. While sympathy towards strikers was better during the Accord period than in 1979, the data are too erratic to tell us whether there was a trend decline during the course of the Accord period. Still, even at the best of times, the number of people whose sympathies were generally against strikers easily outnumbered those whose sympathies were generally for strikers. Figure 6 shows us responses to the propositio n that there should be stricter laws to regulate trade unions. Again, each observation shows a majority in favour of stricter laws. Nonetheless, the data clearly show a reduction in the proportion of Figure 6 . 'There should be stricter laws on unions.' Percentage saying there 'de nitely' or 'probably' should be stricter laws, or who 'agree' or 'strongly agree' with the statement. For precise questions and sources see Table A6 in the Appendix.
people calling for stricter laws during the Accord decade from 1986 to 1996-a trend that continued even after passage of the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993, which was seen as pro-union by some commentators (eg Sloan 1994; Hamilton 1994) . Finally, there is one series which has been running almost annually and quite consistentl y since the mid-1970s: a Morgan Poll question on the perceived degree of integrity and honesty of a number of occupations including 'union leaders'. When commenced in 1976, the question covered 14 occupations; by 2000 this had doubled to 28. It is not as useful a question as the others that have been discussed above (it concerns union leaders, not unions themselves, and does not describe the core activity of unions) but is worth mentioning because of its regularity and consistency. Results are shown in Figure 7 . Typically, this has not been a measure by which Australian union leaders perform well: from the time the series started until the mid-1980s, union leaders rated second lowest (above 'car salesmen') on the ethics and honesty scale, with the lowest scores occurring in the 1984-86 period, when unions were rst seen as exercising their political muscles under the Accord. Since then, however, attitudes towards union leaders have improved. During 1997-2000 the incidence of 'high' ratings for ethics and honesty was double that in the mid-1980s, and union leaders had climbed past a number of occupations to be rated equal 21st of 28 occupations. This is consistent with the other indicators pointing towards improving union sympathy over the 1990s.
The overall trend that emerges from these various aspects of union sympathy appears to be that union sympathy declined slowly between the 1940s and the 1960s, deteriorated sharply during the early 1970s; and recovered slowly, after initially dipping, under the Accord. Yet during the last period, union density fell SYMPATHY FOR THE DEVIL? 69 For precise questions and sources see Table A7 in the Appendix.
from nearly 50% to barely 30%; the decline in union density could not be explained by declining union sympathy.
Union Sympathy in the International Context
Cross-nationa l variations in union sympathy are interesting in their own right, because they reveal something about the differing states of political consciousnes s in different countries. But are such patterns signi cant for unions themselves? Internationa l differences in union density are not explained by international variations in union sympathy (Chaison and Rose 1991) . Nonetheless, the comparative state of union sympathy might indicate something about the vulnerabilit y or otherwise of Australian unions to changes in the institutional , economic or political environment. At the start of the 1990s, slightly over one half of union members were subject to compulsory union membership (Peetz 1998) . The reduction or removal of compulsion-be it through legislative change, management strategy or structural change in the labour market-might have had a more constrained impact if Australian employees had a strong ideological attachment to unions. But if the ideological motivation for membership is weak, unions' membership would be more sensitive to changes in compulsion, irrespective of whether or not ideological motivations played any signi cant role in the typical decision for union exit. Cross-national data are very limited, but what is shown by those which do exist? An international social survey in 1986-87 indicated that when 78% of Australians took the view that unions had too much power, similar views were held by only 60-65% of Britons, Americans and Italians and less than 40% of Austrians and Germans (NSSS 1989) . Even though identical questions were used, these data have to be interpreted cautiously, as different answers re ect particular circumstances. Still, in 1990, while 69% of Australians were telling the NSSS that unions had too much power, only 47% of Italians and Americans, 36-38% of Britons, Norwegians and Israelis, 27% of Germans, and 18% of Hungarians, were expressing similar attitudes (Blanch ower and Freeman 1994, 15) . Other sources have shown comparisons that put Australian unions in an equally gloomy relative position: a US gure of only 37% by 1988 (Mayer 1992, 97) , British gures of 36-40% by 1987-89 (Marsh 1990; Millward 1990) , and a New Zealand gure of 48% in 1988 (Insight New Zealand 1988 . Perhaps Australian unions were more likely than British, American and New Zealand unions to be perceived as being too powerful because they really were more powerful (a debatable proposition). But this would not explain the poor perception of Australian unions when compared with those in Austria, Norway and Germany where union density and, an arguable case can be made, union strength were greater than in Australia.
On other aspects of union sympathy, where data are readily available, Australian unions also perform worse than their overseas counterparts. The four Australian polls taken from 1987 onwards (see Figure 1) showed an average of 61% agreement that Australian unions have been a good thing for Australia. Two British polls over that period cited by Marsh (1990) have an average estimate of over 69%. A small amount of workplace-level data collected for case studies showed similar patterns.
7 Yet it appeared that, in the early 1950s, Australian unions were better regarded than their British counterparts. The estimates of 80% and 75% agreement that unions are a good thing, noted in the 1951 and 1966 APOP polls, respectively (see Figure 1) , compared with estimates of 67% and 63% in Britain in 1955 and 1966 (Marsh 1990, 59; Webb and Wybrow 1981, 78) .
Australians have generally (though not always) been recorded as being unsympathetic towards strikers (see Figure 5 ; also APOP 1979b APOP , 1985a Courier-Mail 1985; McNair 1988) . In the late 1980s, New Zealanders were more sympathetic to strikers than to employers by a ratio of about 3:2. In Australia, those unsympatheti c to strikers outnumbered those sympathetic by a ratio of at least 3:1, though by the mid-1980s it was down to about 2:1 (Insight New Zealand 1988; NSSS 1987 NSSS , 1988 NSSS , 1994 NSSS , 1995 McAllister and Mughan 1987) .
Why do Australian unions appear to have such a weak ideologica l foundation amongst employees and the wider community? One real possibility is that the Australian union movement lacks legitimacy as a result of its use of the strike weapon in the institutiona l context of Australia. The arbitration system has consistentl y held wide public support (APOP 1946 (APOP , 1955 (APOP , 1970 (APOP , 1979a (APOP , 1984b (APOP , 1986a McNair 1988) . Arbitration has been recorded as being of greater importance to Australians than the right to strike (APOP 1948 (APOP , 1949 (APOP , 1960 (APOP , 1962 Morgan Gallup Poll 1977) and polls have generally shown support for the use of sanctions against unions that breach directions of industrial tribunals (eg APOP 1985a). Indications are that, at least in relation to workers not in essential services, 7 As part of a case study the SEMSE questionnaire was administered to workplaces in a multinational pharmaceutical company, Pharm, in both the United Kingdom and South Africa. Amongst employees in the British workplace (PharmUK) with an opinion, 44% disagreed with the statement 'unions in this country have too much power', compared to 25% of Australians in SEMSE who disagreed with the equivalent statement. Similarly, 40% of employees in the South African workplace (PharmSA) disagreed with the statement. None of the 35 Australian workplaces in SEMSE had employees as strongly disposed to disagree with this statement as PharmUK and only two had employees as strongly inclined to disagree as PharmSA. While only 52% of SEMSE respondents disagreed that the country would be better off without unions, 69% of respondents in PharmUK and 56% of employees in PharmSA disagreed. Details on SEMSE can be found in Peetz (1998) .
Australians accept a principle of a right to strike (eg APOP 1971a; Morgan Poll 1992) . Perhaps, however, when arbitration is available they have not recognised the legitimacy of the strike weapon in the same way in which people have accepted it in countries operating under purer collective bargaining frameworks.
These comparative data do not help explain the level of union density in Australia when compared with other countries. But they suggest that Australian unions may be more vulnerable than many of their counterparts overseas to the weakening of union security provisions , as has occurred since the late 1980s throughout Australia, to the point where union preference clauses and compulsory unionism are illegal in most situations.
Conclusion
Union sympathy is in uenced by people's direct experiences of union membership, their direct and indirect experiences of industrial con ict, mediated by the effects of an anti-union media, socialisatio n by their parents and peers, amongst others, regarding unions, the degree to which union behaviour is seen as being consistent or inconsistent with people's own values and norms, and the general climate of debate, opinion and propaganda on the role of unions. Changes in union sympathy can be in uenced by changes in the level of industrial disputatio n (which can affect not only the inconvenienc e people feel from union activity but also the degree to which unions are seen as acting inconsistentl y with social norms), changes in the nature of public debate and propaganda (for example, in the Australian case, on anti-communism), and changes in socialisation arising from broader social forces.
Union sympathy slowly declined between the 1940s and the 1960s, it deteriorated sharply during the early 1970s, and it recovered slowly under the Accord. The deterioration after the 1940s might be attributable to anti-communism and its association with anti-unionis m during the 1950s and 1960s, though the data do not permit us to be de nitive on this point. The forces that were depressing union sympathy in this period more than offset any upward impacts that might have arisen from the decline in industrial disputatio n between the late 1940s and the early to mid-1960s. The deterioration during the 1970s was associated with a signi cant rise in industrial con ict. The improvement in sympathy during the 1980s and 1990s was probably linked to the Accord-related fall in the level of industrial disputatio n and to the level of 'responsibility ' the union movement was seen, in that context, to be exercising, though initially at least this appeared to be tempered by concern with the degree of in uence unions were exerting on public policy. Measures of union sympathy that tapped the degree to which unions were seen as being too powerful improved later, and more slowly, than other indicators of union sympathy. Hence the improvement in union sympathy was slow to take place, compared to the speed and magnitude by which industrial disputatio n fell. This may also re ect lags in the recognition of a decline in disputatio n and/or 'stickiness' in adverse opinions (an aggravation may quickly generate adverse opinions, but those adverse opinions may take considerable time to dissipate after the initial aggravation has long eased).
Despite industrial disputation in the late 1990s being below the levels achieved in any other decade since the war, it nonetheless appears that union sympathy in the 1990s was weaker than it was in the 1940s. Some sort of structural shift appears to have occurred, over which the other trends mentioned above have been laid. The data here are not strong enough to show that this re ects an underlying weakening of the forces that promote socialisatio n to collectivist orientations , but they are suggestive that such might have occurred. With a smaller proportion of workers belonging to trade unions now than at any time in the last 90 years, and with overall sympathy towards unions lower than in the 1940s and 1950s, parental socialisatio n favouring collectivism will also be weaker than in the past, putting ongoing downwards pressure on union sympathy in the future.
Whatever has happened to collectivist orientations , the pattern of union sympathy over the past two decades demonstrates that the decline in union density between the early 1980s and the late 1990s cannot be directly attributed to a shift in union sympathy during this period. While sympathy rose, union density fell, principally-as other research has shown (Peetz 1998 )-because of increasing employer and state resistance to unions, most clearly manifested in the collapse of compulsory unionism, structural changes in the labour market, and the weakness of workplace unionism . By contrast, sympathy and density both fell gradually during the 1950s and 1960s, and both could plausibly be linked to the effects of anti-communism . Improvements in union sympathy over the past two decades may make it easier for unions to increase membership but this may not be suf cient to offset the effect of these institutiona l and structural forces working in the opposite direction.
Of course, it must be acknowledged that Australian unions were starting from what appeared to be, by international standards, a low base in the early 1980s and have yet to recover properly from it. Cross-national data are not robust enough to enable us to de nitively show why Australian unions have been so unpopular . One plausible factor was anti-communism, given the particularly prominent and concentrated role played by communist leaders in the union movement in Australia in the 1950s, and the intimate association of anti-communism with anti-unionism in Australia, particularly when anti-communist ideology was being propagated by conservative political parties and media.
More signi cantly, the evidence points to there being a negative relationship between union sympathy and levels of industrial con ict, and Australia is often cited as being a relatively strike-prone nation. This relative strike-pronenes s is easily overstated; for example, in the decade from 1983, Australia had fewer working days lost per thousand employees than the United Kingdom (ABS 2001b; Department of Labour 1993). What really distinguishe s strikes in Australia from those in the United Kingdom and most other countries is that in Australia they have been, in the context of the tribunal-based award system, illegitimate -at least until 1994. It is dif cult to avoid the conclusion that no small part of the low level of sympathy towards Australian unions is the result of their usage of a tool which has been seen as illegitimate in the eyes of the public, who would have preferred that unions relied on arbitration to secure their goals. Unions in many other countries have simply not faced such a deep problem of legitimacy regarding their use of a key tactical weapon.
Arbitration has hampered union sympathy in another way. While making use of strikes in strategic sites, Australian unions have nonetheless relied heavily upon arbitration to achieve their goals across the rest of their areas of coverage, at the expense of more effective development of workplace-level union organisation (Peetz 1998 ). An argument that has been used in relation to the Accord (Kenyon and Lewis 1992), but which can be generalised to most of the last century for the majority of award-covered employees, is that unions secured substantial gains but for many people did not receive the 'credit' for these gains. By not engaging members in the achievement of gains, unions failed to develop strong union consciousness . Thus arbitration hampered the development of union sympathy against both non-members and members.
It is important to emphasise, though, that it does not follow from these data that unions can reverse their decline in membership by striking less often. For one thing, union sympathy is only one in uence on union membership; it is clearly not the main factor driving changes in membership, and 'successful' industrial con icts can directly increase union membership (Peetz 1996; Western 1993) , much more quickly than any associated decline in union sympathy might affect membership. For another, not all industrial disputes attract the ire of the public. The waterfront dispute of 1998, the dispute with the highest pro le of any during the 1990s, saw public opinion evenly divided between support for the union and support for the employer and the government (Morgan Poll 2001) , and appeared to be associated with a fall in government support 8 -precisely because in this dispute it was the government and the employer that were seen by many people to have acted against the norms of industrial relations by engineering the sacking and replacement of a unionised workforce. In that dispute, the union gave high priority to ensuring its actions remained legitimate in the eyes of the courts and the public. Moreover, the ire of the public is likely to be attracted less and less frequently by industrial disputes: arbitration now is but a shadow of its former self, and the legitimacy of strikes is less open to moral challenge. Since the passage of the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 Australia has adopted a legislative bargaining regime that is closer to those applying in other countries. Indeed, it would be tempting to conclude that this in itself may have assisted union sympathy after 1994, though we should be sceptical that the contributio n would be large at rst, as public understandin g and appreciation of the rami cations of these policy changes is likely to take considerable time. Perhaps over the long term, levels of union sympathy in Australia and elsewhere might converge. One way or another, though, the fate of Australian unions will be determined long before that happens.
